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JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION:
PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT
NICOLE J. RAMSAY
INTRODUCTION
In light of Japan's emergence as a superpower in the financial commu-
nity and the growing concerns of foreign investors about the nations in-
adequate regulatory schemes, there has been an increase in the
importance of the sources of Japanese securities laws and regulations, the
regulatory authorities that govern Japanese securities transactions, and
the ultimate problems of enforcement.
The Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 ("SEL")' and the Commer-
cial2 and Civil Codes3 are Japan's main sources of securities laws and
regulations.' Although these statutes bear some resemblance to the
United States' securities laws,' not all Japanese laws are self-executing,6
and therefore, they require a ministerial ordinance or enforcement order
to be effective.
The most powerful regulatory authority in Japan is the Minister of
Finance7 and its secretariat, the Ministry of Finance.8 The second most
powerful is the Securities Dealer's Association, 9 a self-regulatory organi-
zation whose members are the securities companies themselves.
Although the securities regulations in Japan are vast and broad, en-
forcement problems still remain.' 0 These problems are largely due to the
fact that the political ideology of the Ministry of Finance has not evolved
to meet the growing changes of a modern Japan." The Ministry's prefer-
ence to give "administrative guidance" rather than actually to police the
1. Japanese Securities Exchange Law, Law No. 25 of 1948 as amended through 1985
[hereinafter SEL], reprinted in K. Tsunematsu, S. Yanese, M. Yasuda & T. Takuoka,
International Securities Regulation: Japan Booklet Two, at 1-88 (L Rosen ed. 1986)
[hereinafter ISR].
2. 10 M. Tatsuta, International Capital Markets and Securities Regulations §§ 11.03,
11.12 (H. Bloomenthal ed. 1989) [hereinafter Int'l Capital Mkts] (citing Sh6h6 (Commer-
cial Code), Law No. 48 of 1899, with a number of amendments [hereinafter Sh6h6]).
3. See id. § 11.12 (citing Minp6 (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896 [hereinafter
Minp6]).
4. See generally Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, (discussing the sources of Japanese
Laws and regulations); ISR, supra note 1, Booklets One-Three and Recent Developments
(1986) (same).
5. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (1981) (corresponding American securities law is Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934).
6. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.03; supra note 110 and accompanying
text.
7. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., infra note 168 and accompanying text (client compensation scandal of
1991).
11. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
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activities of the securities companies contributes to this problem.12 The
enforcement problems are further exacerbated by the Ministry's close ties
to the securities business and the conflicts of interest that ensue.' 3 In-
deed, a major scandal in August 1991 placed the Ministry of Finance's
regulatory procedures under great criticism and resulted in several pro-
posals for reform. 4
This Note explores the regulatory scheme of Japanese securities regu-
lations, the problems of enforcement, and several proposals for reform.
Part I discusses the sources of Japanese securities laws and regulations,
including the Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 and Japan's Com-
mercial and Civil Codes. Part II describes the regulatory bodies that
exist within the Japanese system of securities, including public regulatory
authorities, self-regulating organizations, and advisory councils. Part III
addresses enforcement problems with respect to securities regulations, fo-
cusing on the August 1991 scandal involving four main brokerage
houses. Part IV then offers a review of several proposals currently under
consideration by the Ministry of Finance to tighten its control and polic-
ing of securities violations. Finally, this Note concludes that the Minis-
try of Finance's proposals for change are inadequate for solving the
regulatory problems which exist in Japan. This Note emphasizes the
need to separate the administration of the securities industry from the
regulation of the industry by creating an independent regulatory body
that is distinct from the Ministry of Finance.
I. SOURCES OF SECURITIES LAWS AND REGULATIONS
The SEL, along with Japan's Commercial Code and governmental leg-
islation in the form of cabinet orders, ministerial ordinances, and rules,
provides the basic sources of securities laws and regulations in Japan.15
The SEL in effect consolidates and incorporates the United States Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.16 The SEL
imposes disclosure requirements in both the primary (distribution) and
secondary (trading) markets of securities as well as requirements for reg-
ulation of securities transactions, securities companies, and stock ex-
changes. 7 In addition, the SEL includes a provision, similar to the
12. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
15. See generally ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One (discussing Japanese securities laws
and regulations); Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, at § 11 (same).
16. The United States's intent behind these acts is to give full disclosure and prevent
fraud in the securities industry. Although Japan's SEL is based upon a philosophy of
disclosure, it is unclear whether Japan's intent was also to prevent fraud since the consoli-
dation of the Acts occurred during the United States occupation of Japan. In fact, under
pressure from American occupation authorities, Japan created an independent watchdog
agency similar to the United States SEC but later abandoned it four years later when the
occupation forces left. See Impoco, Pulling Strings in Japan's Market, U.S. News &
World Rep., Aug. 12, 1991, at 37.
17. See infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
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Glass-Steagal Act in the United States, prohibiting commercial banks
from entering the securities business. 8
A. SEL And Related Statutes
The SEL provides for disclosure requirements; 19 regulations of securi-
ties transactions;20 regulations of parties engaging in securities transac-
tions, such as securities companies,21 securities exchanges,' securities
dealers associations,23 and securities finance corporations;24 and regula-
tions against fraudulent securities transactions such as unfair dealing,"'
securities manipulation,26 and insider trading.27
In addition to the SEL and SEL Enforcement Order, four main Minis-
terial Ordinances also contain disclosure requirements.2' Similar to
United States securities regulations, Japanese securities laws are pre-
mised on the concept of full disclosure. The disclosure requirements are
extremely extensive, and include mandating disclosure at the time of the
public offering.29 The issuers of publicly offered securities and the issuers
of securities traded on the stock exchanges or over-the-counter markets
must also comply with continuous disclosure requirements. 4 In addi-
tion, there are disclosure requirements applicable to tender offers.31 Pen-
18. See SEL, supra note 1, art. 65.
19. See SEL, supra note 1, arts. 3 to 27-8; Securities and Exchange Law Enforcement
Order, Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, arts. 2-14 [hereinafter SEL Order], reprinted in
ISR, supra note 4, Booklet Two, at 90-99.
20. See SEL, supra note 1, arts. 46 to 51, 58, 107 to 133; SEL Order, supra note 19,
arts. 18-2 to 26.
21. See SEL, supra note 1, arts. 28 to 66; SEL Order, supra note 19, arts. 15 to 18.
22. See SEL, supra note 1, arts. 80 to 106, 134 to 156.
23. See id arts. 67 to 79.
24. See id note 1, arts. 156-2 to 156-14.
25. See il art. 58.
26. See id art. 125.
27. See id. arts. 189 to 90, 205.
28. See Ministerial Ordinance Concerning Registration, etc. of Public Offering or Sec-
ondary Distribution of Securities, MOF Ordinance No. 5, January 30, 1973, as amended
through 1985, reprinted in ISR, supra note 1, Booklet Three, at 1; Ministerial Ordinance
Concerning Registration, etc. With Respect To Public Offering Or Secondary Distribu-
tion Of Foreign Government Bonds, etc., MOF Ordinance No. 26, April 17, 1972, as
amended through 1984, reprinted in ISR, supra note 1, Booklet Three, at 29; Ministerial
Ordinance Concerning Registration, etc. With Respect To Public Offering Or Secondary
Distribution Of Foreign Investment Trust Certificates, MOF Ordinance No. 78, Novem-
ber 18, 1972, as amended through 1985, reprinted in ISR, supra note 1, Booklet Three, at
136; Ministerial Ordinance Concerning Registration etc. With Respect To Tender Offers
Of Securities, MOF Ordinance No. 38, June 9, 1971, as amended through 1982 reprinted
in ISR, supra note 1, Booklet Three, at 39.
29. Disclosure at public offering may be accomplished through the filing of a securi-
ties registration statement as well as through the use of a prospectus. See SEL, supra note
1, arts. 4 to 12, 13 to 17.
30. Issuers may achieve the disclosure requirements by the filing of securities reports
and any amendments thereto, semi-annual reports, and extraordinary reports. See SEL,
supra note 1, arts. 24 to 27; SEL Order, supra note 19, arts. 4 to 5.
31. See SEL, supra note 1, arts. 27-2 to 27-8.
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alties for violations of the above disclosure requirements may be as high
as three million yen, or $22,600, and may include imprisonment with
hard labor for up to three years.32
In addition to disclosure requirements, the Japanese laws regulate se-
curities transactions. Securities transactions are regulated by the SEL, as
well as by two specific Ministerial Ordinances.33 Regulations of securities
transactions include regulations involving securities companies and se-
curities exchanges.3 4 Moreover, penalties for violating these regulations
range from a penal fine of up to 300,000 yen, or $2,260, and/or imprison-
ment with hard labor for up to three years to a non-penal fine of up to
300,000 yen.35
In addition, Japanese securities law regulates the industry's partici-
pants themselves. As with the disclosure requirements, regulations of
parties engaged in securities transactions also emanate from four main
Ministerial Ordinances3 6 as well as from the SEL. These regulations in-
volve numerous rules and restrictions that are imposed upon securities
companies.3 7 The regulations also give a complete list of prohibited ac-
32. See id. arts. 197, 198, 200, 205. Article 197 provides a fine of up to 3 million yen
and/or jail time with hard labor for up to three years. Article 198 provides a fine of up to
one million yen and/or imprisonment with hard labor for up to one year. Article 200
provides for a fine of up to five hundred thousand yen and imprisonment for up to six
months. Article 205 provides for a fine of up to three hundred thousand yen. As of
March 31, 1992 the exchange rate was 132.75 yen for one U.S. dollar. Business Digest,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1992, at D1, col. 1.
33. See Article 1 of The Ministerial Ordinance Concerning Rules, etc. Of Soundness
Of Securities Companies, MOF Ordinance No. 60, November 5, 1965, as amended
through 1985, reprinted in ISR, supra note 1, Booklet Two, at 125; Ministerial Ordinance
Concerning Registration, etc. With Respect To Stabilization Transactions Of Securities,
MOF Ordinance No. 43, June 14, 1971, as amended through 1983, reprinted in ISR,
supra note 1, Booklet Three, at 47.
34. Regulations involving securities companies include requirements for delivery of
sale/purchase notes, depository of guaranty money in conjunction with margin transac-
tions, and the disclosure of opposite party transactions. See SEL, supra note 1, arts. 46,
48, 49. Regulations for transactions involving securities exchanges include guaranteed
deposit requirements, approvals and orders for listing, delisting procedures and applica-
tions, displays of volume of total transactions, sales, and publication of price list, reports
of quotations and volume of transactions, commissions, and margins. See id. arts. 108-3,
110 to 113, 122 to 123, 131 to 132. These regulations cover persons permitted to engage
in the sale and purchase of securities transactions, and provide the qualifications for fu-
tures trading on the securities market by financial institutions. See id. art. 107.
35. See id arts. 206, 208. Article 206 provides for a fine for up to three hundred
thousand yen. Article 208 provides for a non-penal fine for up to three hundred thousand
yen.
36. See Japan Ministerial Ordinance Concerning Securities Companies, MOF Ordi-
nance No. 52, September 30, 1965, as amended through 1985, reprinted in ISR, supra
note 1, Booklet Two, at 115; Japan Ministerial Ordinance Concerning Rules, etc. Of
Soundness Of Securities Companies, MOF Ordinance 60, arts. 2, 3, (November 5, 1965),
as amended to 1985, reprinted in ISR, supra note 1, Booklet Two, at 125; and Ministerial
Ordinance Concerning Securities Business By Short Term Money Market Companies,
MOF Ordinance 24, (April 6, 1982), reprinted in ISR, supra note 1, Booklet Two, at 130.
37. Rules include conditions, standards, and application procedures for licenses; ap-
proval requirements for changes of business, such as method-of-business operations;
mergers of securities companies; and the registration standards and authority of securities
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tivities,3" including bucketing, 39 nominal transfers," the engagement of
securities companies in the public offering of corporate bonds,4' and the
engagement of financial institutions in the securities business." Penalties
against parties engaging in such prohibited behavior may also be as high
as three million yen and may include imprisonment with hard labor for
up to three years. 3
The SEL also contains a number of provisions, encompassing a broad
range of regulations against fraud and manipulation. These provisions
parallel United States regulations and prohibit unfair dealing, manipula-
tion, taking advantage of a special position and insider trading.
The SEL provision against unfair dealing is found in a general anti-
fraud statute4 that is modelled after Section lOb-5 of the United States
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.4s A violation of this prohibition may
subject the violator to imprisonment with hard labor for up to three years
and/or a penal fine of up to three million yen." In addition, an injunc-
tion may be issued by the court, upon the request of the Finance Minis-
representatives. See SEL, supra note 1, arts. 28 to 36, 62 to 64-4. Restrictions include
restrictions on trade names; restrictions on directors assuming concurrent duties; restric-
tions on engaging in concurrent business, pledging, or making loans of securities; and
restrictions on the extension of credit by underwriters. See id. arts. 41 to 43, 51, 61.
38. See id art. 50.
39. See id art. 47.
40. See id art. 44.
41. See id art. 45.
42. See id. art. 65.
43. See id arts. 197, 199, 200, 205, 208. Article 199 provides for a fine of up to one
million yen and/or imprisonment with hard labor for up to one year. Article 208 pro-
vides for a fine of up to three hundred thousand yen.
44. See SEL, supra note 1, art. 58. Article 58 reads as follows:
No person shall commit any act set forth in the following Items:
(1) To employ any fraudulent device, scheme or artifice with respect to
buying, selling or other transactions of securities;
(2) To obtain money or other property by using documents or any other
representation which contains an untrue statement of a material fact
or any omission to state a material fact necessary to make the state-
ments therein not misleading; and
(3) To make use of any false quotation for the purpose of soliciting buy-
ing, selling or other transactions of securities.
45. Section lOb-5 of United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
46. See SEL, supra note 1, art. 197(2).
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ter, to immediately cease the illegal activity.47 Unlike Section lOb-5,
however, this SEL provision does not provide the direct basis for civil
liability.4" To receive a civil remedy, an investor must sue under the
general provisions of contract or tort law contained in the Civil and
Commercial Codes.49
The anti-manipulation provisions found in the SEL also mirror United
States securities regulations. The SEL provision prohibiting manipula-
tion of the securities market50 is similar to Section 9(a) of the United
States Securities Exchange Act of 1934.51 The SEL prohibits the follow-
47. See id. art. 187.
48. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.10; ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at
63.
49. See ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 63; Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2,
§§ 11.10, 11. 12 (citing Minp6, supra note 3, art. 709; Sh6h6, supra note 2, art. 266-3, 12);
see infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
50. See SEL, supra note 1, art. 125. Article 125 reads as follows:
No person shall engage in the following acts for the purpose of creating a false
or misleading appearance with respect to the status of transactions in any secur-
ity, including but not limited to a false or misleading appearance of active trad-
ing of certain securities listed on a securities exchange:
(1) To effect any false sale and purchase transaction in the security con-
cerned which involves no transfer of title thereto;
(2) To sell securities based upon a prior agreement with another person that
the same securities, at the same time and at the same price, will be
purchased by such person;
(3) To purchase securities based upon a prior agreement with another per-
son that the same securities, at the same time and at the same price, will
be sold by such person; and
(4) To entrust or to be entrusted with such acts as mentioned in the preced-
ing Items.
2. No person shall engage in the following acts for the purpose of inducing
the purchase or sale of any security on the securities market:
(1) To effect or to entrust or to be entrusted, by himself or with other per-
sons, a series of transactions in the security concerned creating false ac-
tive trading in such security or making the price of such security
fluctuate;
(2) To circulate a rumor to the effect that the price of any such security will
fluctuate because of market manipulations by himself or by other per-
sons; and
(3) To wilfully make a representation which is false or misleading with re-
spect to any material fact, when transactions in the security concerned
are intended.
3. No person shall effect or entrust or be entrusted, by himself or with an-
other person, a series of transactions of the security for the purpose of
pegging, fixing or stabilizing the price of such security, in contravent ion
of Cabinet Order.
51. Section 9(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange, or for any member of a national securities
exchange-
(1) For the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance of active
trading in any security registered on a national securities exchange, or a
false or misleading appearance with respect to the market for any such
security, (A) to effect any transaction in such security which involves no
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ing activities with respect to listed securities: washed sales, statements
that affect the market price of the security, willful misrepresentation,
matched orders, and any other activity that is used to distort the market
price. 2 Any person violating this provision will be liable for all resulting
damages,53 including damages to persons who bought or sold the security
at a price affected by the illegal conduct.' The problem with this type of
activity, however, is that without a criminal or administrative hearing it
is very difficult to prove manipulation of the securities. 5 This is so be-
cause the Finance Ministry's methods of regulation prevent evidence of
such misconduct from entering the public domain.56
The SEL provision that prohibits taking advantage of a special posi-
tion and insider trading 7 is similar to Section 16(b) of the U.S. Securities
change in the beneficial ownership thereof, or (B) to enter an order or or-
ders for the purchase of such security with the knowledge that an order or
orders of substantially the same size, at substantially the same time and at
substantially the same price, for the sale of any such security, has been or
will be entered by or for the same or different parties, or (C) to enter any
order or orders for the sale of any such security with the knowledge that an
order or orders of substantially the same size, at substantially the same
time, and at substantially the same price, for the purchase of such security,
has been or will be entered by or for the same or different parties.
17 C.F.R. § 240.9a.
52. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.11.
53. See SEL, supra note 1, arts. 30, 126, 197, 207.
54. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.1 1.
55. See id.
56. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
57. See SEL, supra note 1, arts. 189 to 190; see also Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2,
§ 11.13 (discussing insider trading provisions of the SEL); ISR, supra note 1, Booklet
One, at 68-69 and Recent Developments (same); Note, Outside Investors A New Breed
OfInsider Traders?, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transna-
tional Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S319, S329-31 (1992) (dis-
cussing insider trading in Japan). Article 189 reads as follows:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of secret information of a corpo-
ration which may have been obtained by an officer or principal shareholder...
of the corporation by reason of his office or position in the corporation, if such
person realizes any profit by a purchase within six months after sale, or sale
within six months after purchase, of shares of the corporation, the corporation
may order him to tender such profit to the corporation.
2. If the corporation fails to claim, pursuant to the provisions of the preced-
ing Paragraph, within sixty days after any shareholder of the corporation made
a request that the corporation shall make a claim pursuant to the provisions of
the preceding Paragraph, such shareholder may assert a claim in the name of
and on behalf of the corporation.
3. The right to assert a claim against an officer or principal shareholder
under the provisions of the preceding two Paragraphs shall expire unless the
claimant exercises it within two years from the date on which such profit was
realized.
4. The provisions of the preceding three Paragraphs shall not be applied to
cases where such principal shareholder was not such at the time of either
purchase or sale.
Article 190 reads as follows: "No officer nor principal shareholder of a corporation, the
shares of which are listed for trading on a securities exchange, shall sell such portion of
same shares as he does not actually hold."
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Exchange Act of 1934.58 This provision states that directors, supervi-
sors, and ten-percent shareholders must disgorge any short-swing prof-
its.5 9 This requirement, however, applies only to trading in stock, and
not to a shareholder unless he or she held ten percent of the shares at the
time of both the sale and purchase.'
Commentators note, however, that a 1953 amendment to the SEL61
diminished the effectiveness of the provisions against insider trading.62
The amendment repealed an article that had imposed a duty upon insid-
ers to give notice of changes in their holdings. Without this notification
requirement, it has become increasingly difficult to monitor abuses.63 As
a result, the provisions against insider trading are not often used."
As with the other anti-fraud provisions in the SEL, violation of this
insider trading provision constitutes a criminal act.6" Penalties include
imprisonment with hard labor of up to three years and/or a fine for up to
three million yen.66 Still, despite this legislation, there have been no con-
victions for insider trading in Japan.67 Although one might argue that
58. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 reads as follows:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and
sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than
an exempted issuer) within any period of less than six months, unless such se-
curity was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously con-
tracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not purchasing the
security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may
be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the
issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of
the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days
after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such
suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized.
This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such ben-
eficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale
and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which
the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended
within the purpose of this subsection.
17 C.F.R. § 240.16b
59. See SEL, supra note 1, art. 189; see also Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2,
§§ 11.13, 11.11 (discussing insider trading and short-swing provisions of the SEL).
60. See SEL, supra note 1, art. 189; see also Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.13
(discussing insider trading provisions of the SEL).
61. See SEL, supra note 1, Article 188 Deleted.
62. See Intl Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.13.
63. See id.
64. The Ministry of Finance has filed formal charges in just one insider trading case
in the past year, whereas approximately three hundred cases are exposed by the SEC
annually.
65. See SEL, supra note 1, art. 197.
66. See SEL, supra note 1, arts. 207, 205 item 1.
67. See Wood, Why Japan Isn't Ready For Reform, Chi. Trib., Aug. 2, 1991, § 1, at
19, col. 1.
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insider trading violates the general anti-fraud provision,68 regulators
have never used this provision as a basis for criminal sanctions. It is con-
sidered too vague and general for insider dealings. 69
B. Other Securities Laws
In addition to the SEL, there are three other statutes which provide
securities regulations: The Law on Foreign Securities Firms, which gov-
erns foreign securities companies; the Securities Investment Trust Law,
which governs management and securities companies dealing in invest-
ment trusts; and the Certified Public Accountants Law, which governs
Japanese and foreign accountants.
Although the SEL strictly regulates Japanese securities firms, there are
no specific provisions of the SEL that permit foreign securities firms to
engage in securities transactions in Japan.70 As a result of this gap in the
SEL, the Law on Foreign Securities Firms ("FSFL")1 was enacted in
1971.72 The FSFL regulates brokers and dealers who are established
abroad and doing business in Japan. These brokers and dealers are sub-
ject to the same regulations as those applicable to domestic securities
companies.73 Specifically, the FSFL permits a foreign securities firm,
through its branch office in Japan, to engage in securities business subject
to obtaining a license from Japan's Minister of Finance.7 4 In order to
obtain this license, a foreign securities firm must be comparable to a Jap-
anese joint stock company7" and satisfy certain minimum requirements. 6
Failure to obtain a license, however, does not preclude a foreign firm
from engaging in Japanese securities activities.' Upon prior notification
to the Finance Minister, an unlicensed foreign firm may maintain an of-
fice in Japan and engage in such securities-related activities as giving in-
vestment advice and managing an investment trust.78 However, the
unlicensed foreign securities firm must be careful not to enter the securi-
ties business, as violation of the licensing requirement constitutes a crimi-
68. See SEL, supra note 1, art. 58; supra note 44 and accompanying text.
69. See ISR, supra note 1, Recent Developments Booklet, at 5.
70. Id
71. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 1 1.03[1](3) (citing Gaikoku Shokengyosha
ni kansura Horitsu, Law No. 5 of 1971 [hereinafter FSFL]).
72. See ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 118-30.
73. See SEL, supra note 1, arts. 28 to 66; SEL Order, supra note 19, arts. 15 to 18;
supra notes 29-69 and accompanying text.
74. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.03[1](2) (citing FSFI, supra note 71,
art. 3).
75. See ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 119 (citing FSFI, supra note 71, art. 6).
76. The foreign securities firm or its parent company must have three years minimum
experience, meet the amount of paid up capital requirement, and must not engage in non-
securities businesses such as banking, either directly or indirectly, through affiliated com-
panies. See ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 119 (citing FSFL, supra note 71, art. 6).
77. See ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 121.
78. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 4, § 11.22 (citing FSFL, supra note 71, art. 31).
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nal offense.79
In addition to the SEL and FSFL, the Securities Investment Trust
Law ("SITL")80 provides sources of securities regulations for the man-
agement of investment trusts. The SITL was enacted to provide inves-
tors with a facility for making investments in securities by entrusting
their funds to trust banks for management by management companies.8
In order to become a management company for a securities investment
trust, a firm must be a joint stock company having a paid-in capital of at
least fifty million yen, or $377,000.82 Furthermore, the company must
obtain a license from the Finance Minister in order to issue directions for
the operation of trust funds.83 When deciding whether to grant the li-
cense, the Finance Minister examines whether the firm is qualified to be a
management company "in light of its personnel and capabilities in rela-
tion to investment," whether the firm is in a good position to receive a
sufficient profit as a management company, and whether the business
proposed for performance by the firm is "necessary and appropriate in
view of the conditions of securities investment trust and security
markets. ' ' 84
According to a 1950 amendment to the SEL, a certified public ac-
countant must audit the balance sheet and other financial statements of a
securities company.85 These statements must be disclosed in a securities
report and registration statement filed pursuant to the SEL."6 The Certi-
fied Public Accountants Law ("CPAL")87 prescribes requirements for
the qualification, examination, and supervision of accountants; for the
authorization and for organization of accounting corporations; and the
organization, compulsory membership in, and supervision of the Japa-
nese Institute of Certified Public Accountants.88
A foreign accountant who has qualifications similar to a Japanese cer-
tified public accountant and who has received permission from the Min-
ister of Finance may become a foreign certified public accountant.8 9
Permission will be granted, however, only if he or she possesses sufficient
79. See ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 120 (citing FSFL, supra note 71, art. 35).
80. See Intl Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.03[1](3) (citing Shokentoshishintakuho,
Law No. 198 of 1951 [hereinafter SITL]).
81. See generally ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 108 (discussing securities invest-
ment trusts); Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, §§ 11.03[1l](3), 11.19 (same).
82. See ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 111 (citing SITL, supra note 80, art. 6, % 1,
art. 4, 1 2).
83. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.03[1](3).
84. See ISR, supra note 1, Booklet one, at 111 (citing SITL, supra note 80, art. 7).
85. See SEL, supra note 1, art. 193-2; see also ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 80
(discussing Japanese accounting standards).
86. See id.
87. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.03[l](4) (citing Koninkaikeishiho, Law
No. 103 of 1948 [hereinafter CPAL]); see also ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 80-84
(discussing public accounting qualification requirements).
88. See ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 80-84.
89. See id. Booklet One, at 82.
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knowledge of Japanese accounting laws and regulations.' In addition,
permission is granted, however, only if he or she is eligible to become a
foreign certified public accountant under the rules of the Japanese Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants. 91
C. Implementation and Enforcement of Regulations
The securities regulations enumerated in the previously mentioned
statutes are not effective unless they are implemented and enforced by the
regulatory authorities. Implementation requires affirmative acts by the
Ministry of Finance to pass the appropriate legislation.9a Enforcement,
in turn, requires affirmative acts by the Public Prosecutor's Office
through criminal prosecutions and by the Ministry of Finance through
its administrative proceedings.93 Finally, in the event that neither of
these agencies succeeds, an individual investor may enforce the securities
regulations by seeking private remedial relief under Japan's Commercial
and/or Civil Codes.9 4
Many of the laws and regulations set forth in the regulatory statutes,
including the SEL and Commercial and Civil Codes, are not self-execut-
ing; rather, they are effective only when implemented by cabinet rules
and/or ministerial ordinances.9" As Japanese law commands, "[c]abinet
rules, which provide rules in areas delegated by the statute, must be
passed by the cabinet, signed by the ministers concerned and the Prime
Minister, . . . and promulgated by the Emperor." 96 Ministerial rules,
however, are "signed and promulgated by the minister(s) concerned with
providing rules in areas delegated by the statute or by cabinet rules." '97
In addition, the Director of the Securities Bureau has issued a number of
releases indicating how the statutes and rules are to be interpreted. 98
Furthermore, business correspondences issued from various divisions in
the Securities Bureau to their regional officers may also be publicly
released.99
Chapter IX of the SEL gives an explicit list of all punishable acts
under the statute. The penal law specifically provides for punishment of
willful acts. However, the courts have interpreted the law to include
90. See id
91. See id (citing CPAL, supra note 87, art. 16-2; see also id at 80-82 (discussing
qualifications for becoming a Certified Public Accountant).
92. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.0411](5).
93. See id § 11.20
94. See id §§ 11.0312], 11.11.
95. See, eg., SEL order, supra note 19, at 89-113 (providing an example of a cabinet
order which is necessary to implement the regulations under the SEL, supra note 1).
96. Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.03[1](5) (citing Kenp6 (Constitution of Ja-
pan)(1946), arts. 7(1), 74).
97. Id (citing Kokkagyoseisoshikiho, Law No. 120 of 1948, art. 12).
98. See id
99. See id Although releases and business correspondences are intended to be used
as guidance for the regulatory authorities and do not constitute direct sources of law, in
practice securities administration is carried out in accordance with them. See id.
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reckless offenses if implied by the statute.oc Sanctions range from a civil
fine of five thousand yen (thirty-eight dollars) or less to a penal fine of up
to three million yen and may include imprisonment with hard labor for
up to three years. 10'
Indictment of a criminal suit is under the jurisdiction of the public
prosecutors.' 0 2 The Minister of Finance, however, must notify the public
prosecutor's office of all conduct which he suspects is a criminal violation
of the securities laws.'0 3 The Ministry's options for prosecuting defend-
ants for violations of the SEL are not, however, limited to actions taken
by the Public Prosecutor's Office. The Minister of Finance may apply to
the court for an injunction to prevent the continued illegal activity on
behalf of the public interest or for the protection of investors, although
this has never been done."°4 In addition to criminal proceedings against
a defendant, the Finance Minister and his Ministry have "broad control
power over a variety of persons" and may issue orders through its ad-
ministrative proceedings against persons engaged in securities transac-
tions. 10 5 The Minister, however, must give all defendants notice and an
opportunity to be heard before any actions may be taken against a de-
fendant in the administrative proceedings. ' 6 Although an opportunity
to be heard is a necessary prerequisite for any actions to be taken, the
Finance Minister may dispense with this notice and opportunity require-
ment if the defendant disregards the notice for no legitimate reason.0"
In addition, there are sources of regulatory law that are administered
not by the Minister of Finance, but by the Minister of Justice, through
the Commercial and Civil Codes.'08 The Commercial and Civil Codes
provide private remedial relief to individuals injured by violations of the
SEL.' °9
100. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.20[l].
101. SEL, supra note 1, arts. 197 to 210.
102. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.20 (citing Keisoh6 (Criminal Procedure
Law No. 131 of 1948), art. 247).
103. See id (citing Keisoh6 (Code of Criminal Procedure Law No. 131 of 1948) art.
239).
104. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.20[l].
105. Id § 11.20[2].
106. Id
107. See SEL, supra note 1, art. 182; Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.20.
108. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
109. Japan has a unitary system ofjurisdiction and as a result no problems ofjurisdic-
tion exist. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.21 Venue is determined by the
general principles applicable to the proceedings initiated by both the government or an
individual plaintiff. See id. Venue is established in the district in which the defendant has
his domicile, residence, or office. See id. (citing Minsoh6 (Code of Civil Procedure), Law
No. 29 of 1890 arts. 2, 9). If a defendant has no domicile in Japan or his domicile is
unknown, venue is established in the district where the defendant's assets are located. See
id. (citing Minsoh6 art. 8). If the action is based upon tort law, venue may also be estab-
lished in the district where the wrong occurred. See id. (citing Minsoh6 art. 15).
If the suit is against a foreign defendant, service may be made by a Japanese govern-
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Under the Commercial Code, directors of a corporation"'0 are jointly
and severally liable for damages sustained by third parties if they have
willfully or with gross negligence engaged in misconduct in discharging
their duties.III In addition, directors who make an untrue statement of a
material fact in a stock or debenture subscription form, warrant, or finan-
cial statements, or who make a false public announcement, are also
jointly and severally liable. 12
An individual shareholder of a company can bring a derivative suit on
behalf of the corporation against all the directors and supervisors who
participated in the misconduct. 3 Upon the request of the defendant-
directors, however, the court can order the shareholder to post security
for costs of the proceedings. 4 In addition, a shareholder who prevails
"has a right to force the company to pay him a reasonable amount, not
exceeding the attorney fees." 1 However, "a bad faith shareholder who
has lost a derivative suit may be liable for damages to the company."' 1 6
If an injured plaintiff cannot sue under any of the specific provisions of
the Commercial Code, he or she may resort to the general tort provisions
in the Civil Code." 7 In order for the general tort provision to be applica-
ble, the plaintiff must prove the illegality of the defendant's conduct, will-
fulness or negligence, causation, and the amount of loss. 1 ' When an
employee of the corporation participates in illegal conduct, the plaintiff
can sue the corporation, the employee's supervising director, and the em-
ployee himself.' 19
II. JAPANESE REGULATORY AUTHOrrEs
Japanese securities laws and regulations are enforced and regulated by
three groups of regulatory authorities and organizations. The first group
mental branch located in the defendant's country or if this is impossible, service may be
effected by a public announcement. See id (citing Minsoh6 arts. 175, 178 to 180).
Finally, if the plaintiff has no domicile or office in Japan, the plaintiff, upon request of
the defendant, must post security for the costs in the event that the plaintiff loses. See
Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.21 (citing Minsoh6 art. 107).
110. The provisions establishing liability against directors also apply to supervisors and
individual defendant-employees. See id A supervisor cannot escape liability unless he
proves that he did not act willfully or with gross negligence. See id.
111. See id. § 11.12 (citing Sh6h6, supra note 2, art. 266-3).
112. See id. (citing Sh6h6, supra note 2, art. 266-3). Furthermore, if the misconduct is
the voted result of board action, all those members who voted in favor of the misconduct
are liable. Even those members who participated in the vote but did not record their
dissents are presumed to have voted in favor of the misconduct. Intl Capital Mkts, supra
note 2, § 11.12 (citing Sh6h6, arts. 266-3, 266).
113. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, §§ 11.14, 11.21 (citing Sh6h6, supra note 2,
arts. 267 to 268-3, 280).
114. Id § 11.21 (citing Minshoh6 107).
115. Id. (citing Sh6h6, supra note 2, arts. 268-2, 280, 280-11).
116. Id (citing Sh6h6, supra note 2, art. 268-2, 1).
117. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.12 (citing Minp6, supra note 3, art. 709).
118. See id
119. See id. (citing Minp6, supra note 3, art. 715).
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includes public regulatory authorities such as the Minister of Finance,
the Ministry of Finance, and the Securities Bureau. The second group
consists of self-regulatory organizations including the Securities Ex-
change, the Securities Dealer's Association, and the Securities Invest-
ment Trust Association. The third and final group consists of advisory
councils such as the Securities and Exchange Council and the Financial
Accounting Council.
A. Public Regulatory Authorities
The Minister of Finance, located in Tokyo, has the responsibility of
administering and enforcing the securities laws. 120 He is appointed, and
can be removed, by Japan's Prime Minister, who in turn is appointed by
the Diet. 121 The Finance Minister receives his rule-making authority di-
rectly from the SEL.122
The Finance Minister's secretariat is the Ministry of Finance, an ad-
ministrative body created in 1949.123 The Ministry of Finance is divided
into seven internal bureaus.124 One such bureau is the Securities Bureau,
created to help the Ministry of Finance regulate securities businesses and
their transactions. 125 The Securities Bureau acts much like the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Unlike the SEC,
however, the Securities Bureau is not an independent regulatory
agency. 126 The Securities Bureau, acting on behalf of the Finance Minis-
ter, is responsible for granting licenses for securities exchanges, for secur-
ities businesses, and for securities investment trusts, as well as for
supervising these organizations and their business associations. 127
The Bureau must also examine the securities registration, establish
corporate accounting standards, supervise certified public accountants,
and audit corporations and the Japanese Association of Certified Public
Accountants. 28 In addition, "[t]he Bureau's staff processes numerous
filings under the securities laws, including registration of securities, peri-
odic reports [and] proxy soliciting materials."' 29 Furthermore, the Bu-
reau has extensive authority through its "administrative and rule making
powers," ' though not nearly as much as has the SEC in the United
120. See Intl Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.02[1).
121. See id § 11.02[21 (citing Kenp6 arts. 67, 68).
122. See ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 26.
123. Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.02[l] (citing Okurasho Setchiho, Law No.
144 of 1949, art. 11).
124. ISR, supra note I, Booklet One, at 26 (citing MOF Order, art. 1).
125. Intl Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.02[1].
126. See id. The Securities Bureau is simply a division of the Ministry of Finance
acting under the Finance Minister. See id.
127. See ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 26 (citing MOF Order, art. 9).
128. See id. (citing MOF Order art. 9).
129. Intl Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.02[1].
130. ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 27. The Bureau, in the name of the finance
minister, enforces the securities laws by "conducting investigations which may lead to
administrative proceedings, civil actions for injunctive relief, or notification to the public
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States.
B. Self-Regulatory Organizations
There are three self-regulatory organizations in Japan: the Securities
Exchanges, the Securities Dealer's Association, and the Securities Invest-
ment Trust Association."' Each authority has extensive regulations and
rules of conduct that bind its members. 132
There are eight securities exchanges in Japan. The Tokyo Stock Ex-
change is the largest, which in 1977 accounted for over eighty percent of
the volume of shares traded on all exchanges. 133 The Osaka Stock Ex-
change is the second largest, which in 1977 accounted for over twelve
percent of the total volume."3 Six small exchanges account for the re-
mainder of the market.
Each securities exchange must be licensed by the Minister of Fi-
nance,1 35 who reviews the application and examines its rules, organiza-
tion, and location.1 36 Moreover, only Japanese and foreign securities
companies that are licensed pursuant to the SEL can become members of
the securities exchange. 137
In addition, the Securities Exchange Law requires a securities ex-
change to have a constitution, regulations for securities business transac-
tions, and regulations for entrustment contracts.1 38 A constitution must
establish rules for membership, organization, administration, and listing
of securities.1 39 Business regulations must control the sale and purchase
of securities on the exchange.140 Finally, entrustment contract regula-
tions must address transactions between a member and its customers.
14 1
If a securities exchange fails to take disciplinary actions against a
member who has violated the SEL or the rules of the exchange, the Min-
ister of Finance may revoke the exchange's license, suspend its opera-
tions, or order it to dismiss one or more of its officers.' 42
In addition to membership on the securities exchanges, both Japanese
and foreign securities companies are also members of the Securities
prosecutor's office for criminal prosecutions." Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2,
§ 11.02[1].
131. See generally ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 27-31 (discussing self-regulatory
organizations).
132. See id
133. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 1 1.02[2](a) (citing Okurasho Shakenkyoku
Nempo, Table 76, at 104).
134. See id (citing Okurasho Shakenkyoku Nempo, Table 76, at 104).
135. See SEL, supra note 1, art. 81.
136. See id arts. 81 to 83.
137. See id arts. 81, 90; SEL Order, supra note 19, art. 18-2.
138. See SEL, supra note 1, arts. 82, 88, 108, 130.
139. See id art. 88.
140. See id art. 108.
141. See id art. 130, 2.
142. See id art. 155.
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Dealer's Association, although this membership is not compulsory. 143
The Association, is an organization formed pursuant to the SEL' 4 for
the purposes of ensuring fairness in securities dealing and maintaining
protection of investors.145 To achieve this goal, the Association ensures
its members' compliance with the securities laws and regulations, over-
sees the conduct and assets of its members, educates the officers and em-
ployees of members, and conducts exams of securities salesmen.146 The
Association, pursuant to the SEL, must also register with the Ministry of
Finance and have a constitution, rules of fair practice, and a uniform
practice code, all of which bind its members. 7
As with the Securities Exchanges and Dealer's Association, the Securi-
ties Investment Trust Association is a self-regulatory organization whose
members are the management and securities companies which engage in
the sale and purchase of securities investment trusts. 48 The Securities
Investment Trust Association is a corporate entity formed pursuant to
the provisions of the SITL.' 49 This Association was created by the secur-
ities investment management companies for the purpose of promoting
the protection of investors and the sound development of securities in-
vestment trusts.150 It has rule-making power under the supervision of
the Ministry of Finance, which reserves the power to approve or disap-
prove the rules of conduct of the association and to issue necessary
orders. 15
C. Advisory Councils
The final group of regulatory authorities consists of advisory councils.
Their role is to research various problems that arise in the securities busi-
ness and to recommend reforms to the Ministry of Finance. 5 2 The most
influential advisory council is the Securities and Exchange Council. It
acts as an advisory council to the Ministry of Finance and is created
pursuant to the SEL.'5 The purpose of the Securities Exchange Council
is to research issues relating to the issuance, sale, and purchase of securi-
ties.' 54 The members of the Council are chosen from among the leaders
143. See generally ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 28-30 (discussing organization
and responsibilities of the Securities Dealer's Association); Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note
2, § 11.02[2](6) (same).
144. See SEL, supra note 1, art. 67.
145. See ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 29.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 29-30 (citing Articles of Association art. 5).
148. See generally id Booklet One, at 30-31 (discussing the organization and responsi-
bilities of the Securities Investment Trust Association).
149. See id. Booklet One, at 30 (citing SITL, supra note 80, art. 24-2).
150. See id. at 30-31.
151. See id.
152. See generally id. Booklet One, at 32 (discussing the organization and responsibili-
ties of the Advisory Councils); Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.02[5] (same).
153. See SEL, supra note 1, art. 165.
154. See ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 32.
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in the securities, banking, insurance, and other industries' 5 for a term of
two years.
156
The Financial Accounting Council is another advisory council to the
Ministry of Finance. 5 7 Its primary purpose is to establish financial ac-
counting standards for business corporations."5 8 Membership on the
Council is contingent upon appointment by the Minister of Finance for a
two year term and is limited to forty part-time members. 159
III. PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT
Although Japanese securities laws, regulations, and regulatory author-
ities are highly developed, many problems of market manipulation, dis-
honesty, and unfair dealings still frequently arise.' 6° Most problems, on
close analysis, appear to stem from the Ministry of Finance's failure to
effectively enforce the securities regulations.
16 1
The Ministry of Finance's ideological approach to securities regulation
is closely intertwined with its ethical and political ideologies. 62 As a
result, information relating to illegal activities or misconduct by parties
engaged in the securities industry usually does not enter the public do-
main. 1 63 The lack of litigation against fraudulent securities activities' 64
cannot be attributed to a failure to expose misconduct and illegal activi-
ties to the Ministry of Finance. 65 Indeed, these activities are exposed to
the Finance Ministry, but the public remains unaware of the extent of
these ongoing practices because the Ministry's method of addressing
these activities is to reprimand the guilty parties behind closed doors and
without any public record. 6 6 In fact, one commentator was shocked by
155. See id,
156. See SEL, supra note 1, arts. 166 to 167.
157. See ISR, supra note 1, Booklet One, at 32.
158. See id; Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.0212](5)(b).
159. See Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 11.02[2](5)(b).
160. See, eg., infra note 168 accompanying text (discussing a prime example of contin-
uing fraudulent activities).
161. See Special Report International Regulatory Outlook '90, Int'l See. Reg. Rep.,
January 3, 1990. Some critics argue that the securities laws are not highly developed but
are simply "vague laws rife with loop holes," and that it is for this reason that regulatory
problems exist. See Yates, Reform Far Off For Japan Markets, Chi. Trib., Aug. 4, 1991,
§ 1, at 1, col. 1. Although this argument has merit, one may also argue that the Ministry
of Finance can use these ambiguities for its advantage, and thus police even more activi-
ties, but it simply chooses not to. In addition, if enforcement problems exist because of
these ambiguities then it is up to the Ministry of Finance to propose clearer legislation
rather than sit back and use the ambiguities to justify its inaction.
162. See infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
163. Wood, Why Japan Isn't Ready For Reform, Chi. Trib., Aug. 2, 1991, § 1, at 19,
col. 2.
164. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
165. The Ministry of Finance was aware of the client compensation scandal approxi-
mately one year before it was exposed by the media. See Nickerson, Japan Feeling Back-
lash From Stock Scandal, Boston Globe, June 30, 1991, at 65, col. 2.
166. As one commentator noted, "The rule in Japan appears to be: Hide abuses when-
ever possible. If they become public, acknowledge them, express regret, sacrifice a few
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the recently uncovered securities scandal not because of the exposed ac-
tivity, but because the activity was actually exposed to the public.1
67
A. Examples of Enforcement Problems
The August 1991 client compensation scandal is a particularly effec-
tive example of Japan's enforcement problems because this scandal illus-
trated the underlying causes of the enforcement problems: the practice
of Amukadari, Japan's ideology towards securities regulation; and the
Ministry of Finance's methods of administrative guidance.
The August 1991 scandal is a prime example of the Ministry of Fi-
nance's ineffectiveness in enforcing Japanese securities regulations. This
scandal involved client compensation for trading losses by the four larg-
est brokerage houses in the country: Nomura, Nikko, Daiwa and
Yamaichi. 68 Since then, according to an industry reporter the "largest
seventeen brokerage houses have so far admitted to paying a total of
171.9 billion yen, [or 1.1 billion dollars], in compensation to 608 organi-
zations and nine individuals."' 16
9
August 1991, however, was not the first time that the Ministry of Fi-
nance had known of these practices. In August 1990 more than ten Japa-
nese securities houses, including Daiwa and Yamaichi, were hit with tax
penalties totalling seven billion yen, or forty-seven million dollars, for
declaring compensations made to large corporate clients as non-taxable
scapegoats and then return to business as usual." Wood, Why Japan Isn't Ready for
Reform, Chi. Trib., Aug. 2, 1991, § 1, at 19, col. 2.
167. See Trapped in the Rubble, Economist, June 29, 1991, at 65.
168. Public exposure of the scandal has also led to an investigation by the Ministry of
Finance into the activities of Nomura Securities. It has been discovered that Nomura,
along with Nikko, has "reportedly offered over $100 million each in financing to Susumu
Ishii, reputedly the retired godfather of one of Japan's most notorious crime syndicates."
Impoco, Pulling Strings in Japan's Market, U.S. News & World Rep., Aug. 12, 1991, at
38; see also Trapped in the Rubble, Economist, June 29, 1991, at 65 (discussing the roles
of Nomura and Nikko in the securities scandal). In addition, Nomura has been accused
of manipulating stock by artificially boosting the value of shares in Tokyu Railways Co.
after Susumu Ishii had invested heavily in the stocks. See id. Gangster affiliations with
securities is no surprise to those who participate in Japan's securities markets. "Rumors
about gangster contacts have long swirled around almost every big financial group in
Japan." Id at 65. More specifically, these kinds of practices have allegedly been part of
an ordinary course of business for Nomura, as well as a contributing factor for its success
in the securities industry. See generally Alletzhauser, The House Of Nomura: The Inside
Story Of The Legendary Japanese Financial Dynasty (HarperPerennial, 1991) (exploring
the rise of power of Nomura Securities). Gangster affiliations in the securities industry
exist because of "the constant need for organized crime to launder money." Trapped in
the Rubble, Economist, June 29, 1991, at 65; see also Note, Putting Starch in European
Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and
Regulation, Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S429,
(1992) (discussing money laundering in financial markets). In light of this historical
gangster affiliation, the Ministry of Finance's investigation and subsequent sanctions
against the parties involved appear only to be a ploy to turn the critical eye off itself and
onto the securities firms.
169. Securities Scandal Tops the Diet Agenda, MOF Working to Save Scarred Reputa-
tion, Int'l See. Reg. Rep., Aug. 12, 1991, at 8.
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business expenses.' 70
Client compensation, if used to attract clients, is prohibited by SEL
Article 50. Article 50, entitled Prohibited Activities, states in pertinent
part:
It shall be unlawful for any securities company, its officers or employ-
ees to commit any of in [sic] the following acts:...
(2) To solicit buying, selling or other transactions of securities by un-
dertaking to a customer to absorb the loss, in whole or in part, to be
incurred with respect to such securities. 1
7 1
The problem with Article 50, however, is that it prohibits a brokerage
house from promising to reimburse an investor in advance for losses suf-
fered in the market, but does not prohibit a broker from compensating a
client after the fact. 1 2 Indeed, the Finance Ministry regulators have at-
tempted to justify their inaction in the client compensation scandal by
arguing that reimbursements are "illegal only if promised when the or-
ders ... were solicited."'
17 3
Under Article 50, the Ministry of Finance's argument may be valid,
because the Article is limited to acts used to solicit securities sales.' 74
There are, however, other laws which could be used against the broker-
age houses, with or without evidence of when the promises were made.
These include SEL Article 58, the anti-fraud provision,' and SEL Arti-
cle 125, which bars false trading activity. 76 Both of these articles were
taken from the United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and imple-
170. "The firms illegally spent at least [17 billion yen, or Sl 15 million,] to compensate
major clients for their losses in the October 1987 stock market crash." Japanese Broker-
ages Face Tax Fines For Client Paybacks, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep., Aug. 13, 1990.
171. See SEL, supra note 1, art. 50.
172. See Yates, Reform Far Offfor Japan Markets, Chi. Trib., Aug. 4, 1991, § 7, at I,
col. 1.
173. See Stevens, Japan's Rigged Financial Market, N.Y. Times, July 30, 199 1, at A 19,
col. 5. This is a specific example where the Ministry of Finance attempts to exploit the
ambiguity of the SEL by sitting back and doing nothing to correct the situation. See
supra note 165.
174. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Although this provision does not form
the direct basis for civil liability, this should not bar its use by the Ministry of Finance
against brokerage houses for violations of the SEL. Paragraph One of Article 58 specifi-
cally forbids the use of fraudulent schemes in any securities transactions. See id. One can
easily argue that the client compensation practices were schemes aimed only at the bro-
kerage houses' largest clients, since the practices were not extended to the smaller inves-
tors. See Sterngold, Signs Seen in Japan Scandal of Efforts to Curb Inquiry, N.Y. Times,
July 22, 1991, at D1, col. 1.
176. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Again, an argument may be advanced
that the compensation activities violate this provision. In order to advance such an argu-
ment, the Ministry of Finance would have to investigate the manner in which the im-
proper compensation was paid. Reports have persisted that "the payments were made by
selling securities to the clients at artificially low prices, then repurchasing the securities
later at higher prices." Stemgold, Signs Seen in Japan Scandal of Efforts to Curb Inquiry,
N.Y. Times, July 22, 1991, at D1, col. 1. If these allegations are true, this activity seems
to be clear evidence of a violation of the statute against manipulative or false trading.
1992] S273
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
mented in the SEL during the United States occupation after the World
War II.177 These sections make violators criminally punishable with up
to three years of hard labor.178 That neither of these statutes has been
suggested as a means of punishing the brokerage houses for their activi-
ties is not evidence that Japan lacks the appropriate regulatory laws, but
that it simply fails to enforce the laws effectively.
The Ministry of Finance has been "publicly accused of everything
from turning a blind eye to downright complicity in the expanding secur-
ities scandal."' 79 The main criticism leveled against the Ministry of Fi-
nance centers on its close relationship with the securities industry, which
gives rise to conflicts of interest.180
The practice of Amakudari-literally, "descent from heaven""'8 -has
been a contributing factor in the conflicts of interest that have arisen.
Amakudari refers to a practice that permits the top securities firms to
hire retired senior officials from the Ministry of Finance.8 2 Because of
these employment practices, the Ministry of Finance has shown a will-
ingness to overlook misbehavior of these securities firms.18 3
The practice of Amakudari stems from another problem of securities
regulations enforcement in Japan, which rests upon the failure of Japan's
political ideologies to evolve into modern times. The Japanese have, in
the words of one commentator, a "Confucian understanding of politics,"
and they "believe that only the highly educated elite have both the
knowledge and virtue necessary to govern effectively."' 84
Unlike the United States western democratic tradition, which has
"cultivated a healthy distrust of those in power," the Japanese tradition
177. See Sterngold, Signs Seen in Japan Scandal of Efforts to Curb Inquiry, N.Y.
Times, July 22, 1991, at Dl, col. 1; supra notes 44, 50 and accompanying text.
178. See Sterngold, supra note 177; supra notes 46, 53 and accompanying text.
179. MOF Opposes Calls for Japanese SEC; Offers Merger of Investigation Bureaus,
Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep., July 29, 1991, at 1.
180. See id.
181. See Securities Scandal Tops the Diet Agenda; MOF Working to Save Scarred Rep-
utation, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep., Aug. 12, 1991, at 8.
182. More than two hundred high ranking officials have "made the descent" in the last
five years. Powell, Tokyo's Power Club, Newsweek, July 8, 1991, at 40, 41. In fact, a
private credit research agency, Teikoku Databank Ltd., reported on September 13 that
"at least 170 former Finance Ministry and Bank of Japan officials are board members of
commercial banks and securities houses." Reform Council Proposes Watchdog Commit-
tee for Securities Industry Report From Japan, Inc., Sept. 16, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis library, NEWSWIRES File. As a result, former Ministry officials account for one
in every twenty seats'on bank and brokerage boards. See id.
183. See Reform Council Proposes Watchdog Committee for Securities Industry, Report
From Japan, Inc., Sept. 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWSWIRES File.
In fact, not only does this practice result in the Ministry of Finance overlooking certain
activities, but it is alleged that the Ministry of Finance is more "reluctant to inspect
banking and securities companies because so many former ministry officials work for
them." Oishi, Scandal Cleanup Awaited; Reform Proposals on Political Calendar, Nikkei
Weekly, Aug. 17, 1991, at 1, col. 6.
184. Wood, Why Japan Isn't Ready For Reform, Chi. Trib., Aug. 2, 1991, § 1, at 19,
col. 2.
S274 [Vol. 60
JAPANESE SECURITIES
thrives on trust of those in power "in the same way that children trust
their parents."1 5 Consequently, while the United States system designs
entities in order to check the balance of power, the Japanese system re-
sults in a concentration of power in the hands of the elite.18 6 This ideol-
ogy has trickled down from those governing the securities industry to the
participants themselves. In Japan, "[b]reaking a rule for a client is the
ultimate expression of gratitude and it also psychologically binds a cus-
tomer to a particular [business]."' 7 Thus, client compensation in the
recent scandal was not only an ongoing activity, but was an expected
activity.188
The client compensation scandal demonstrates the need to change this
elitist ideology. Client compensation is aimed at benefitting the strong
and powerful customers in the securities industry. The idea that the "bu-
reaucracy's first obligation is to the greater good of the economy, as op-
posed to enforcing the regulations"' 89 appears to have influenced the
Ministry of Finance in its involvement in the compensation practices.'S
As one analyst has pointed out, had those large clients "lost hundreds of
millions when the market crashed, the reverberations would have been
felt through the entire economy."' 9 '
While this tradition of politics has been successful in the past, Japan
has changed in the last few decades, while the goal of the Japanese lead-
ership has not. 192 The origins of this change lie in the securities firms'
"excessive pursuit of profit of the past five years."' 9 3 As one commenta-
tor has noted, the "bull market created an atmosphere in which tradi-
tional standards evaporated."' 94 In fact, Mr. Aida, the current chairman
of Nomura, has admitted that "[t]oo much of [Nomura's] energy was
centered on pursuing profits. [Nomura] was so successful that [it] be-
came arrogant not just in [its] business but in [its] attitudes to the whole
world."' 95 Thus, as the Ministry itself recognizes, it can no longer rely
on Japan's unwritten code of behavior, but must codify the principles of
honesty and fairness into its securities laws and regulations. 96
An additional factor contributing to repeated violations of the SEL by
185. Id
186. See id.
187. Yates, Reform Far Offfor Japan Markets, Chi. Trib., Aug. 4, 1991 at § 7, col. 1.
188. See id
189. Nickerson, Japan Feeling Backlash from Stock Scandal, Boston Globe, June 30,
1991, at 65, 73.
190. See iL
191. Id
192. See id.
193. Wagstyl, Reforms May Lead To Respect, F'm. Times, Aug. 5, 1991, at 112, col. 1.
194. Id
195. Id (quoting Yukio Aida); see also A. Alletzhauser, The House Of Nomura: The
Inside Story of the Legendary Japanese Financial Dynasty (HarperPerennial, 1991) (dis-
cussing the rise of power of Nomura Securities).
196. See Scandal and Contrition May Signal New Era of Market Surveillance, Int'l Sec.
Reg. Rep., July 15, 1991, at 5.
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large securities firms is the Ministry of Finance's preference to enforce its
will by "administrative guidance-the supervision of financial companies
through a mass of written and unwritten regulations." 197 In typical Min-
istry of Finance practice, top Japanese securities executives make daily
"pilgrimages" from their offices to the Ministry of Finance.1 98 They re-
port their activities and new developments to ministry officials, who
either approve or disapprove of their activities. 99 As a result of this
practice, it is rarely possible to prove that a particular company broke or
bent a particular rule.
There is no doubt that during the post-war decade of reconstruction
and rapid growth, administrative guidance played an important role in
the Japanese financial industry," ° but now "such guidance has outgrown
its usefulness and is now even doing harm to the economy by widening
the gap between the development of the national economy and individual
citizens' affluence."'2 ' The end result, one critic argues, is that "the pub-
lic is denied an opportunity to share in information essential to a free
market economy. "202
Finally, securities companies often escape prosecution for their prac-
tices partly because the Ministry of Finance too often relies upon self-
regulating organizations, such as the Securities Exchange 20 3 and the Se-
curities Dealer's Association, °4 to discipline companies for violations of
the regulations. This is problematic because certain violations of the
SEL-customer compensation, for example-are not violations of any
rules or regulations of the organizations.
B. Impact of Enforcement Problems
The Ministry of Finance's problems in enforcing the securities regula-
tions have a major impact on two groups of investors: small investors
and foreign investors. Indeed, Japan still remains "a closed system with
privileges based upon the power to serve the system. ' 20 5 Japan's regula-
tory scheme, therefore, caters to powerful corporate and political inter-
197. Wagstyl, Tokyo Finds a Nod and a Wink No Longer Enough, Fin. Times, Aug.
10/11, 1991. "The system is flexible. But it can be vague and unclear. It tends to dis-
criminate in favour of companies and individuals with long experience of dealing with the
ministry." Id.
198. See Wagstyl, Reforms May Lead To Respect, Fin. Times, Aug. 5, 199 1, at 112, col.
1.
199. See id.
200. See Bureaucratic 'Guidance'ls Unwanted, Unwarranted, Nikkei Weekly, Aug. 24,
1991, at 6, col. 1.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
205. Wood, Why Japan Isn't Ready For Reform, Chi. Trib., Aug. 2, 1991, § 1, at 19,
col. 2. "Foreigners do not serve the system and neither do small investors. Crime syndi-
cates do serve the system so they get help." Id.; see also supra note 168 (discussing crime
affiliations in the securities industry).
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ests at the expense of small investors, 206 as demonstrated by Nomura's
role in the recent client compensation activities."' v Although Nomura's
smaller retail customers may protest exclusion from the benefits of these
activities, such deals attract large investors to Japan's market. Such large
capital investments "supplied the capital for the firm's worldwide expan-
sion, which has created thousands of jobs and generated hundreds of mil-
lions of yen in taxes." 208
Japan's bias against small investors is not unique in the securities mar-
kets of the world.2' 9 However, Japan's enforcement problems are
clouded by Ministry officials' beliefs that the benefit of capital flow into
the domestic securities system outweighs the costs of bias against small
investors. This philosophy governing the securities industry focuses nar-
rowly on Japan's domestic securities system, and fails to consider the
impact of its bias on other foreign securities systems.210
Foreign investors are excluded from Japan's securities market for three
primary reasons. First, its system of administrative guidance results in a
regulatory system "managed in an informal way that benefits Japanese
companies and is generally not comprehensible to outsiders."21' Second,
Japanese brokerage houses believe that the potential capital gains re-
ceived from promising special treatment, such as compensation to for-
eign investors, are not large enough to enable the securities firms to
afford "the potential liabilities that come with such guarantees. ' 212 Fi-
nally, Japanese brokerage houses are leery of offering such inducements
to foreign investors because most of the activities that the brokerages
could offer would be illegal under the securities laws of the foreign inves-
tor's home country.213
In order for Japan to maintain its legitimacy in the "transnational"
world of financial services, it needs to restructure its methods of regulat-
ing securities laws. Former Prime Minister Kaifu admits that the Japa-
nese securities market is expected to "channel funds effectively not only
206. See Powell, Tokyo's Power Club, Newsweek, July 8, 1991, at 40.
207. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
208. Powell, Tokyo's Power Club, Newsweek, July 8, 1991, at 42.
209. See Rowen, Scandal, Japanese Style: Looking the Other Way, Wash. Post, June
30, 1991, at HI, col. 5. Japan simply demonstrates that the "small investor has no busi-
ness being in anybody's stock market-Japan's, New York's, Hong Kong's or Taipei's."
Id. at H6, col.1. "The small investor is not buying 'a share of America,' as [the] New
York Stock Exchange [advertises]: He or She is shooting craps with high rollers with
deep pockets." Id.
210. See, e.g., Malloy, Bumper Cams Themes of Convergence in Int'l Regulation, in
Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Financial Serv-
ices in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S1, S3 (1992) (cautioning countries from focusing
simply on their own domestic securities system and overlooking its impact on foreign
securities systems).
211. Sterngold, Signs Seen in Japan Scandal of Efforts To Curb Inquiry, N.Y. Times,
July 22, 1991, at Dl, col. 1.
212. Powell, Tokyo's Power Club, Newsweek, July 8, 1991, at 41.
213. See iL at 41-42.
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for the Japanese economy, but also for the global economy. . ". ."I" To
accomplish this, however, Japan's securities industry must regain the
confidence of both foreign and small investors.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Despite the client compensation scandal, the Director of the Finance
Ministry's Securities Bureau, Nabuhiko Matsuno, defended the work of
his agency.2 5 The publicity surrounding the most recent scandal, how-
ever, reduces the Ministry of Finance's ability to have the "luxury of
conducting business in its normal state of relative obscurity." '216 Public
attention in Japan is highly focused on what the Ministry will do. This
has forced the Ministry of Finance to consider several proposals for
reform.
A. Proposals For Reform
The Ministry of Finance recognizes the need for reform and has pro-
posed the creation of a new regulatory agency that would be under the
umbrella of the Ministry of Finance.21 7 This new "watchdog" agency,
"tentatively called the Financial Fair Trade Commission," would be a
"semi-independent board of five to seven members who would be finan-
cial experts and possibly lawyers."28 This agency's primary function
would be to investigate violations of the securities regulations. The
agency, however, would only be able to recommend penalties to the Fi-
214. Kaifu Urges Brokers To Tighten Self-Regulation, Reuters, Oct. 23, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWSWIRES File.
215. See Scandal and Contrition May Signal New Era of Market Surveillance, Int'l Sec.
Reg. Rep., July 15, 1991, at 5, 6.
216. Securities Scandal Tops The Diet Agenda; MOF Working to Save Scarred Reputa-
tion, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep., Aug. 12, 1991, at 1.
217. Id. at 8.
218. Wada, Financial Watchdog Likely Outside Ministry, Nikkei Weekly, Sept. 14,
1991, at 4, col. 2; see also Reform Council Proposes Watchdog Committee for Securities
Industry, Report From Japan, Inc., Sept. 16, 1991, available in LEXIS Nexis Library,
NEWSWIRES File ("the investigative committee should have five standing members,
each of whom will be either a former Supreme Court Justice, legal officer, public account-
ant or academic").
One criticism made against the Ministry of Finance's employees is that they are not
experts in the field of securities regulations. A commentator has suggested that new edu-
cation policies should be developed to educate those in the securities industry on financial
economics. See Hebner, Financial Markets Demand New Education Policies, Nikkei
Weekly, Aug. 31, 1991, at 6, col. 6. "Japanese universities have only 15-20% of the
number of finance professors that the average North American university has." Id.
Hebner suggests that this has two major consequences. "First, there is relatively little...
research [conducted] examining Japanese financial institutions." Id. "Second, relatively
few university students receive a rigorous training in financial economics." Id. As a
result, employees of brokerage houses are unable to think "independently and critically
about complex issues" since all of their education comes from the brokerage houses them-
selves. Id.
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nance Ministry.21
The Ministry of Finance recognized the need for anti-compensation
laws and proposed an anti-scandal bill that won quick approval by the
Diet.220 The bill bans discretionary account management " and prohib-
its compensation for losses on stock transactions.' It also includes a
"pledge to consider more fundamental changes" in the SEL.3 Further-
more, under this bill, a broker could be imprisoned for up to one year
and/or be fined a maximum of one million yen (approximately $7,450)
for making compensation payments. 4 An investor could be fined half
that amount for accepting the payments." 5
Also, in response to the scandal, "[tihe Ministry of Finance ordered
the 'big' four brokerages-Nomura Securities, Daiwa Securities, Nikko
Securities, and Yamaichi Securities-to refrain from doing business with
corporate clients for four days and advised the companies to punish exec-
utives involved in the misdeeds."" 6
The former Minister of Finance, Kaifu, also recognized that the self-
regulatory bodies need to "set up fair and transparent rules in order to
avoid a recurrence of the recent brokerage scandals." 27 Proposals for
reform include "opening up... [the domestic] markets to more partici-
pants... and increasing the transparency of government administration
of the securities market." 228
219. See Blustein, Reforms Proposed In Japan, Panel Calls For Agency To Regulate
Securities, Wash. Post, Sept. 14, 1991, at Cl, col. 2.
220. See Securities Bill Passes with Accompanying Resolution, Int'l See. Reg. Rep., Oct.
7, 1991, at 5.
221. See icL Discretionary accounts were criticized as "the root of improper compen-
sation because the investors could disclaim responsibility for their investment risks."
Mori, Japan Moves Closer To Tougher Securities Regulation, Reuter Bus. Rep., Sept. 10,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWSWIRES File.
222. See Securities Bill Passes With Accompanying Resolutions, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep.,
Oct. 7, 1991, at 5.
223. Id The SEL amendments prohibit securities companies from "proposing or mak-
ing arrangements which promise either compensation for losses or an addition to profits
or actually offering compensation or an addition." Id. (quoting amendments to SEL leg-
islation). In addition, a "criminal penalty is imposed on clients of securities companies
when, by their requests, an arrangement is reached, or they accept an offer of compensa-
tion for losses or an addition to profits from the securities companies." Id. (quoting
amendments to SEL legislation).
224. See Securities Bill Passes, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep., Oct. 7, 1991, at 5.
225. See id
226. Helm, Japan Restricts Business Deals Of 4 Brokerages, LA. Times, July 9, 1991,
at D1, col. 5. However, as of October 1991, Ministry officials have imposed "the most
sweeping sanctions ever" in the securities business against Nomura securities for its affili-
ation with the stock manipulation of Tokyu Railroad. See Chandler, Japan Finance Min-
istry Toughens Penalty Against Nomura for Securities Violations, Asian Wall St. J.
Weekly, Oct. 14, 1991, at 28, col. 1. It ordered Nomura "to suspend operations at more
than half its domestic branch offices, close its corporate-sales division for one week and
stay out of government bond auctions" for an unspecified amount of time. Id
227. Kaifu Urges Brokers To Tighten Self-Regulation, Reuters, Oct. 23, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWSWIRES File.
228. Id
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Although the Ministry of Finance acknowledges the need for reform,
criticisms of the Ministry's proposals have come from the public, from
businesses, and from a wide range of politicians. Even if the new regula-
tory commission were approved by the Diet, it would still be under the
umbrella of the Ministry of Finance and "be part of a system staffed by
people who accomplish things informally, not through institutional or
legal channels." '229 Consequently, the public and some top political and
corporate leaders favor a proposal that calls for the creation of a more
independent investigative body.
The leading such proposal calls for a Japanese-style Securities Ex-
change Commission, modeled after the United States Securities Ex-
change Commission.23° Under the SEC model, an independent agency
would then have full investigative and judicial powers to prosecute viola-
tions of the securities laws outside of the Ministry of Finance. It would
also prohibit the Ministry of Finance from playing "a dual role as both
protector and overseer of securities regulations." '231
The Japanese-style SEC proposal, however, is not supported by the
Ministry of Finance.232 The most obvious reason, though not acknowl-
edged by the Ministry, is that it would diminish the Ministry's exclusive
control over the securities industry.233 Matsuno has argued that an SEC
system would not work because of the differences in each country's se-
curities industry. As evidence, he explains that there are over 12,000
securities companies registered for securities trading in the United States
and that, during a year, approximately "200 of these change as a result of
the relative ease with which they can enter and leave the business. In
such circumstances, an 'SEC responsible for regulating these companies
is important'."2 In Japan, however, there are fewer than 270 registered
securities companies, which must satisfy strict license qualifications and
cannot freely decide to leave.23 The Ministry of Finance believes that
"it is more efficient and preferable for us to stop malpractice before it
229. Wood, Why Japan Isn't Ready for Reform, Chi. Trib., Aug. 2, 1991, § 1, at 19,
col. 2.
230. In the beginning, then Prime Minister Kaifu and the Liberal Democratic Party
were strong proponents of creating an independent body modeled after the United States
SEC. See Japan's Brokers Under Pressure To Adopt Reforms, Bus. Int'l; Bus. Asia, Sept.
2, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWSWIRES File. It is unclear, however,
whether these supporters are truly supporting the creation of such a body or whether
they are doing so simply to salvage their reputations and save face under local and inter-
national criticism. See id
23 1. Blustein, Reforms Proposed In Japan, Panel Calls For Agency To Regulate Securi-
ties, Wash. Post, Sept. 14, 1991, at Cl, col. 2.
232. See MOF Opposes Calls for Japanese SEC, Offers Merger of Investigation Bureaus,
Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep., July 29, 1991, at 1-2.
233. See Japan Panel Proposes New Financial Watchdog Body, Reuters, Sept. 13, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWSWIRES File.
234. Scandal and Contrition May Signal New Era Of Market Surveillance, Int'l Sec.
Reg. Rep., July 15, 1991, at 5, 6 (quoting N. Matsuno, director general of Japan's Minis-
try of Finance's Securities Bureau).
235. See id.
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happens, '  rather than after the fact as the SEC has done in the United
States.237
The Japanese Securities Dealer's Association has also recognized the
need for reform, and has proposed the most significant reform to date.
Proposed measures include conducting more frequent inspections of bro-
kerage operations and increasing the staff in charge of such inspec-
tions.2 38 In addition, the Association has announced that it will ban
discretionary accounts within the securities industry. 9 These accounts
give brokerages wide discretion in managing clients' investments, and it
was losses in such accounts that prompted institutional clients to demand
compensation from brokerages. 2'
In response to the compensation scandal, the Securities Dealer's Asso-
ciation has sought to establish two committees, "the Headquarters for
Promotion of Industry Reform, which will advise on policy options to
improve investor confidence;" and another committee to include scholars
and journalists, "designed to provide opinions from outside the
industry." 24'
The Tokyo Stock Exchange will soon announce that it plans to take
certain measures to prevent fraudulent stock dealings.242 One plan is to
acquire more directors from outside the industry.2 43 It further proposes
to punish brokerage houses more severely for irregular trading and
strengthen its inspection of stock transactions. 2'
B. Analysis Of The Proposals
In order for Japan to effectively eliminate its problems of regulatory
enforcement, it must initially codify the Finance Ministry's administra-
tive guidance in clear laws and regulations. It must then sever the ad-
ministration and promotion of the securities industry from the regulation
of the industry. In order to accomplish this, the practice of Amukadari
must be abolished, thereby eliminating conflicts of interest, and an in-
dependent investigative body must be created separate from the Ministry
of Finance.
The Finance Ministry's proposals for reform are not sufficient to over-
236. MOF Opposes Calls for Japanese SEC Offers Merger of Investigation Bureaus,
Int'l See. Reg. Rep., July 29, 1991, at 2.
237. See id.
238. See Japanese Dealers To Strengthen Self-Regulation, Reuters, Sept. 18, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWSWIRES File.
239. Yates, Reform Far Offfor Japan Markets, Chi. Trib., Aug. 4, 1991, § 1, at 4, col.
1.
240. 1di; see also supra note 221 (discussing discretionary accounts).
241. Thompson, Bank of Japan Chief Calls for Clear Securities Rules, Fin. Times, July
18, 1991, at 6, col. 1.
242. See Japan's Brokers Under Pressure to Adopt Reforms, Bus. Int'l; Bus. Asia, Sept.
2, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWSWIRES File.
243. See id This proposal would eliminate the practice of Amukadari. See supra
notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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come regulatory enforcement problems because they do not address the
fundamental causes of the problems; rather, they only address the partic-
ular issues involved in the recent client compensation scandals.
The anti-compensation legislation, although useful because it specifi-
cally bans client compensation, does not address the fact that the Minis-
try of Finance had approved the activity after the fact through its
"administrative guidance." It also does not address the Ministry's reluc-
tance to prosecute any securities violations.245 In addition, the penal
fines for violating the legislation are not large enough to act as a disincen-
tive24 unless they are used in conjunction with more criminal
prosecutions.
Furthermore, the Ministry's proposal for a semi-independent agency
appears to be a smoke screen created in response to public criticism. As
it stands, the new agency would simply be in the ambit of the Ministry of
Finance. This does not eliminate any of the fundamental problems of
enforcement, such as the Ministry's close ties with the industry or the
conflicts of interest that arise.247 In addition, the Ministry has neither
the "resources [n]or the inclination" to separate the industry's roles of
promotion and regulation and thus put a stop to the illicit practices. 248
The proposals to create a Japanese-style SEC, however, would effec-
tively separate the roles of promotion and regulation, and would thus be
a step toward substantive regulatory reform in Japan. The aim of the
proposal is to create an independent body, separate from the Ministry of
Finance, which is empowered with the duties of investigating securities
misconduct and initiating criminal proceedings against the wrongdo-
ers.249 The Director of the Securities Bureau, Matsuno, argues that such
an agency is not needed because there are fewer securities firms in Japan
that need policing.250 The mere fact that there are fewer brokerage firms
245. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
246. The fines proposed are minimal in relation to the potential profits earned by en-
gaging in such activities and thus, are not a disincentive to the parties involved.
247. In fact, since it is the Ministry of Finance that selects the members for the agency
the result could lead to further instances of conflicts of interest. See supra note 218.
248. See Japan's Brokers Under Pressure to Adopt Reforms, Bus. Int'l, Bus. Asia, Sept.
2, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWSWIRES File. "While the [Ministry
of Finance] has administrative responsibilities roughly equivalent to four major American
agencies-the SEC, the Federal Reserve Board, the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission and the Comptroller of the Currency-it has only about one-fourth of the 8,000
workers employed by those Washington bureaucracies." Yates, Reform Far Off for Ja-
pan Markets, Chi. Trib., Aug. 4, 1991, § 1, at 4, cols. 4-5.
249. Contrary to the Ministry of Finance's arguments, the goal of this proposal should
not be to adopt the United States SEC as it stands because it too has its own inherent
regulatory problems. See, e.g., Note, Increasing United States Investment in Foreign Se-
curities: An Evaluation ofSEC Rule 144A in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and
Regulation, Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S179,
(1992) (discussing problems of over regulation by the United States SEC). The goal
should be to adopt the idea of an independent regulatory model and adapt it to meet the
needs of Japan's regulatory system.
250. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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participating in the securities industry in Japan, however, does not mean
that the volume of incoming capital and the opportunity for abuse is any
less. In fact, because the capital flow is concentrated in four main bro-
kerage houses-Nomura, Nikko, Daiwa, and Yamaichi-the opportu-
nity for abuse is equal to, if not greater than, that found in the United
States. Therefore, the number of Japanese firms" I is not indicative of the
strength or influence of the Japanese Dealers. 52
Matsuno also argues that there is no need for an SEC-type regulatory
body because of Japan's strict licensing requirements." 3 However, it is
precisely these licensing requirements that have caused firms to engage in
activities such as client compensation.2 " The licensings make it ex-
tremely difficult 2"5 for firms to enter the securities business, and as a re-
sult competition among the existing brokers is limited, thus leading them
to compete in other ways such as offering client compensation. 56
The implementation of a Japanese-style SEC would eliminate this lack
of competition. By using a system of registration, as in the United States,
the securities market would be open to more companies interested in par-
ticipating in the securities industry, thereby increasing the competition
among brokers.
CONCLUSION
Japan's regulatory enforcement problems are the direct result of, first,
the close relationship between the Ministry of Finance and the securities
companies it regulates and, second, the Ministry's obscure manner of
regulation through administrative guidance. In order to have an effective
domestic securities industry, and in order to respond to the growing pub-
lic pressures that resulted from the recent scandal, changes must take
place in the enforcement of the securities regulations by the regulatory
authorities, especially by the Minister of Finance. Meeting the needs of a
domestic securities industry should not be the only goal of the Minister
251. There are over two hundred Japanese firms, of which twenty-five have offices in
London and fourteen have offices in the United States compared to over twelve thousand
broker-dealers in the United States, only twenty three of which are foreign dealers. See
Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 2, § 1.05[2] (citing 1987 SEC, Ann. Rep. 112).
252. See id Four of the six largest and nine of the twenty-five largest securities firms
in the world are Japanese firms. See id In 1987, the four largest Japanese firms had a net
income of approximately six billion dollars compared to a net income of seven hundred
million dollars for the three largest United States firms. See id
253. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
254. See Government Panel to Propose Semi-Independent Stock Watchdog, Kyodo
News Serv., Sept. 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS WIRES File.
255. The number of securities firms decreased tremendously as a result of the enact-
ment of the licensing requirements. In 1963, before the enactment of the requirements,
there were 597 firms in Japan's securities industry. In 1968, after enactment of the re-
quirement to have a license rather than a registration, the number was reduced to 277.
This reduction was "a result of mergers and dissolution of weak firms which found it
difficult to meet licensing standards." Int'l Capital Mkts, supra note 4, § 11.04(4]
256. See Government Panel To Propose Semi-Independent Stock Wtatchdog, Kyodo
News Serv., Sept. 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWSWIRES File.
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of Finance and his Ministry. In order to maintain its legitimacy as a
competitive securities market in a transnational financial world, Japan
must ensure that the political ideology of the Ministry of Finance is
reformed.
The best way to achieve these goals is to create an independent regula-
tory agency, separate from the Ministry of Finance, modeled after the
SEC in the United States. By establishing such an agency, the adminis-
tration and promotion of the securities industry will be separate from the
regulation of the industry, thus removing a major barrier to the effective
enforcement of securities laws and regulations in Japan.
